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 IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
 
 
THE STATE OF UTAH,   : 
 
 Plaintiff/Appellee,   : 
 
v.      : Case No. 20090080-SC 
 
VICTOR HERNANDEZ,   :  
 
 Defendant/Appellant.   : 
 Appellant is incarcerated 
 
ARGUMENT 
In its response, the State abandons the issues raised below and argued in the Brief 
of Appellant, and instead raises two new issues which it argues support the district 
court’s denial of Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary hearing.   
First, the State argues that article I, section 13 (hereinafter art. I, §13), of the Utah 
Constitution refers exclusively to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United 
States of America, meaning that because class A misdemeanors are not indictable 
offenses under the federal Constitution, they are not governed by art. I, §13.  Br. of 
Appellee, at 4-6.  Next, the State argues, in the alternative, that the probable cause 
statement included with informations satisfies the state constitutional requirement for a 
preliminary hearing.  Id. at 6. 
These arguments ignore a basic principle of constitutional law and the plain text of 
our State Constitution.  An analysis of the issues raised by the State will show that the 
State’s arguments are without merit. 
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Because the State’s response has raised issues which were not considered in the 
Brief of Appellant, Mr. Hernandez’s reply brief will only focus on these new issues.  
Although the focus of the issue has changed, the issues argued in Mr. Hernandez’s 
response, and in his original brief, provide this Court with the controlling analysis and 
interpretation of art. I, §13, which requires a reversal of the district court’s final order 
which denied Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary hearing.       
I. ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, REFERS TO 
UTAH TERRITORIAL LAW, THEREBY REQUIRING PRELIMINARY 
HEARINGS TO BE HELD IN ALL CASES OF CLASS A MISDEMEANORS 
PROSECUTED BY INFORMATION  
 
To clarify the first issue raised by the State, that art. I, §13, of the Utah 
Constitution refers to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a brief 
analysis of the development of Utah’s territorial laws, and their interaction with the 
United States Constitution, is necessary.   
It is well settled that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land, 
providing the floor below which protections may not fall, not the ceiling.  U.S. v. Seljan, 
547 F.3d 993, 1013-14 (9th Cir. 2008) (Callahan concurring).  As such, Congress remains 
free to provide greater statutory protections than those contemplated by the Constitution.  
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 18 (vesting in Congress the power to make all laws necessary 
and proper for executing all powers Congress is vested by the United States 
Constitution).1
                                                 
1 See also Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 186 (4th Cir. 2006) (Congress passed the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 “to afford [inmates] greater 
protection of religious exercise than what the Constitution itself affords”); U.S. v. Jones, 
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The State’s response fails to consider this well-settled principle of constitutional 
law.   
The power to make “all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or 
other Property belonging to the United States” was vested in Congress by the Untied 
States Constitution.  U.S. Const. art. IV, §3, cl. 2.  Acting under this power, on September 
9, 1850, the United States Congress passed “An Act to establish a territorial Government 
for Utah” (hereinafter Organic Act).  31st Cong. Sess. I, ch. 51, 9 Stat. 453 (1850).  The 
Organic Act vested the legislative power for the Territory of Utah in a governor and 
legislative assembly.  See Organic Act, Section IV.2
All laws passed by the territorial legislative assembly and governor were required 
to “be submitted to the Congress of the United States, and if disapproved [were] null and 
of no effect.”  Id.  Any enactment of Utah’s territorial legislature was, therefore, 
susceptible of being disapproved by Congress and rendered invalid; but, if an enactment 
was not disapproved by Congress, then it was valid, so long as it did not conflict with the 
  This legislative power “extend[ed] 
to all rightful subjects of legislation, consistent with the Constitution of the United States 
and the provisions of this act.”  Id. at VI.   
                                                                                                                                                             
410 F.Supp.2d 1026, 1030-1031 (D.N.M. 2005) (Congress may afford greater protection 
to a defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, but not allow certain types of waiver, 
whereas the Constitution might not prohibit it); U.S. v. Brainer, 691 F.2d 691, 698 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (The Sixth Amendment, however, merely secures certain minimal trial rights 
against encroachment by government. In no way does it prevent Congress from according 
the accused more protection than the Constitution requires, nor does it preclude Congress 
from acting on the public's interest in speedy justice). 




United States Constitution or federal legislation.  State v. Norman, 52 P. 986, 988 (Utah 
1898).   
The laws of the Territory of Utah, compiled by the territorial legislature in 1888 
and published as the Compiled Laws of Utah, Volume I and II, were, therefore, passed 
with the approval of the United States Congress.  Id.; Organic Act, Section IV.  These 
territorial laws added to existing constitutional protections, and created the legal 
framework for the Territory and State of Utah.  Norman, 52 P. at 988; see also Utah 
const. art. XXIV, §2 (territorial laws in force in 1896, which were not “repugnant” to 
Utah’s Constitution, were required to remain in force until they expired, or were altered 
or repealed by the state legislature). 
Among the protections expanded by Utah’s territorial legislature was the federal 
constitutional requirement that “capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s]” be prosecuted 
by indictment.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  Under territorial law, all offenses punishable by a 
fine of more than three hundred dollars, imprisonment of more than six months, or both, 
were required to be prosecuted by indictment.  Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. II, §4783 
s.3 (1888) (Every public offense must be prosecuted by indictment, except: [o]ffenses 
triable in justices’ and police courts)3
                                                 
3  Volume I of the 1888 Compiled Laws of Utah may be found at the following address: 
; id. at §3023(3) (justice and police courts had 
jurisdiction over “all misdemeanors punishable by a fine less than three hundred dollars, 
http://content.lib.utah.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/uthisstat&CISOPTR=5872
&REC=10  




or imprisonment in the county jail or city prison not exceeding six months, or by both 
such fine and imprisonment”).  This requirement not only encompassed felonies, as 
required by the Fifth Amendment, but also included some misdemeanors, commonly 
referred to as “high”, “gross”, or “indictable” misdemeanors.  Blacks Law Dictionary, 
841, 1089 (9th ed. 2009).  This class of misdemeanors is known as class A misdemeanors 
under current Utah law.   
When Utah’s Constitution was drafted in 1895, it was done with the intent “to 
make the government for the state complete and operative from the very time of the 
taking effect of the Constitution.”  State v. Lewis, 72 P. 388, 390 (Utah 1903).  To do so, 
the drafters of Utah’s Constitution unequivocally decreed that “[a]ll laws in the Territory 
of Utah now in force, not repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they 
expire by their own limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature.”  Utah 
Const. art. XXIV, §2. 
This decree includes territorial laws of criminal procedure which mandated that 
“indictable,” or class A, misdemeanors be prosecuted by indictment.   
In spite of this clear decree, the State claims that art. I, §13, ignores the territorial 
requirements so prominently featured in article XXIV, section 2, of the Utah 
Constitution, and instead refers to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
a document penned more than a century before the creation of Utah’s Constitution. 
Analysis of the plain meaning of art. I, §13, its historical context, and this Court’s 
analysis of this provision show that the State’s argument is without merit.   
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a. The plain text of article 1, section 13, refers to Utah Territorial law, 
thereby requiring preliminary hearings to be held in all cases of class A 
misdemeanors prosecuted by information.  
 
“It is a cardinal rule of construction that constitutions should be construed in light 
of their framers’ intent.”  American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 
1985).  In doing so, “the starting point should always be the plain meaning of the textual 
language.”  American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶115, 140 P.3d 1235 
(Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).  This analysis 
should include the provision in question as well as “other [related] constitutional 
provisions.”  West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1015 (Utah 1994). 
An analysis of the plain meaning of art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution, as well as 
related constitutional provisions, shows that art. I, §13, built upon existing territorial 
requirements for the prosecution of indictable offenses by giving prosecutors the option 
of prosecuting felonies and “indictable misdemeanors” by information.   
Art. I, §13, states that “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate . . ..”  The phrase “[o]ffenses heretofore required,” as used in art. I, §13, is 
tellingly different from the phrase historically used to refer to felonies: “[C]apital or other 
infamous crimes.”  Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 354 (1886) (“Infamous 
crimes” are defined as crimes “punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary”) (citation 
omitted).  See also U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury”).  Rather than limiting itself to felonies, the plain meaning of art. I, §13, embraces a 
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wider variety of crimes than simply felonies, and explicitly directs readers to consider 
laws governing the Territory of Utah.   
Art. I, §13, begins with the word “offenses.”  Offenses does not just restrict itself 
to felonies but “may comprehend every crime and misdemeanor, or may be used in a 
specific sense as synonymous with ‘felony’ or with ‘misdemeanor,’ as the case may be . . 
.”  22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §3, at 4 (1989).  Offenses encompasses all violations of the 
law, “often [minor ones]”  Blacks Law Dictionary 1186 (9th ed. 2009).     
Art. I, §13, then directs the reader to consider all requirements existing when our 
State Constitution was ratified by using the word “heretofore,” defined as “[u]p to now; 
before this time.”  Id. at 795.  With these definitions in mind, art. I, §13, may be read as 
follows: “’[V]iolation[s] of the law,’ including minor ones, ‘[u]p to now, [or] before this 
time’ required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information . . .”  
Id. at 1186, 795.   
In order to create continuity between the laws of the Territory of Utah and State of 
Utah, while giving prosecutors the option of prosecuting cases by information (an option 
only available to states), art. I, §13, codified existing territorial requirements regarding 
the prosecution of criminal cases in the Territory of Utah, and gave prosecutors the 
ability to now prosecute these cases by information or indictment.   
This conclusion is supported by other related constitutional provisions which also 
refer readers to territorial laws.  Article VIII, section 8, for example, required a 
consideration of territorial laws when determining the jurisdiction of justice courts by 
stating that “[t]he jurisdiction of justices of the peace shall be as now provided by law . . 
 8 
.”  Utah Const. art. VIII, §8 (amended 1984).  Additionally, article XXIV, section 2, of 
the Utah Constitution, states that “[a]ll laws in the Territory of Utah now in force, not 
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own 
limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature.”  These provisions furthered the 
intent of our State Constitution, “to make the government for the state complete and 
operative from the very time of the taking effect of the Constitution”, Lewis, 72 P. at 390, 
by unequivocally linking State laws to Territorial laws, allowing our new State to begin 
operation with proven, functional laws.       
In fact, in considering article XXIV, section 2, the argument can be made that the 
requirement of continued prosecution of these “indictable misdemeanors” is implicitly 
required in art. I, §13, and explicitly required in article XXIV, section 2, with the former 
provision merely adding prosecution by information to the prosecutorial repertoire.   
The plain meaning of art. I, §13, and related constitutional provisions, refers to 
laws of the Territory of Utah.  The State’s argument to the contrary is without merit. 
b. The intent of the drafters of article I, section 13, was for this provision to 
refer to Utah Territorial law, thereby requiring preliminary hearings to 
be held in all cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information.  
 
Although the starting point of interpretation of constitutional analysis is the text 
itself, additional clarification may be gained from analyzing historical evidence of the 
state of the law when our Constitution was drafted as well as the debates at the 1895 Utah 
Constitutional Convention.  American Bush, 2006 UT at ¶12; Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 
1072-73. 
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The drafters of the Utah Constitution intended art. I, §13, to refer to territorial 
laws.  This intent is clearly seen in the following exchange from the twentieth day of 
Utah’s Constitutional Convention: 
Section 13 of the preamble and declaration of rights was then read as 
follows: 
Section 13. Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictments shall be prosecuted by information, after examination 
and commitment by a magistrate, or by indictment, with or without 
such examination or with commitment. The grand jury may consist 
of any number of members, of not less than five nor more than 
fifteen, as the judge of the court may order. A grand jury may be 
drawn and summoned whenever in the opinion of the judge of the 
district, public interest demands one. 
 
Mr. WELLS. Mr. Chairman, I only wish to say before the committee begin 
firing at this section that it is almost the same as in the states of Michigan, 
Wisconsin, Washington, Colorado and California, and in all those states I 
am informed that this system has worked extremely well. 
 
Mr. Bowdle offered the following as a, substitute for section 13: 
 
No person shall be held to answer in a criminal case except on 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate or on 
an indictment with or without examination and commitment. The 
grand jury shall consist of seven members and shall be drawn and 
summoned only when in the opinion of the judge of the district, 
public interest demands one. 
 
Mr. EVANS (Weber). .1[sic.] think the only difference is in the number of 
grand jurors. 
 
Mr. BOWDLE. Practically that is true. The only objection that I have to the 
first part of the section is “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment,” that is taken from the California revised or new constitution, 
and undoubtedly they had in mind their old constitution. Now, we have no 
organic existence as a State until this Constitution is adopted and we are 
admitted, and we are not looking back to a time when, as a state, we were 
prosecuting crimes in a different way, and it seems to me that it is 
preferable in that respect. It does not change the substance a particle, but it 
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reads here, “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment.[sic.]  Heretofore prosecuted where? Not in the State of Utah. 
 
Mr. EICHNOR. In the Territory. 
 
Mr. BOWDLE. That is the only point I have.  
 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 313 (1898).4
Mr. Bowdle’s intention, as is ours, was to clarify to what the phrase “offenses 
heretofore required” referred.  The answer from Mr. Eichnor was clear and to the point:  
Offenses prosecuted “[i]n the Territory [of Utah].”  Id.  The discussion then continued:  
  
Mr. MALONEY. Mr. Chairman, the provision as contained here is in the 
constitution of the state of Washington. They meant under the territorial 
system. Section 25 of the Washington constitution provided that offenses 
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, and so on_[sic.]so that 
the committee is right and this ought to be adopted as it is. 
 
Mr. CREER. Mr. Chairman, the only objection I have to this section is that 
it provides that all criminal cases be required to be prosecuted by 
indictment. There are criminal cases below felonies where they were not 
required to be prosecuted by indictment, and I think the language as it is 
now is better, “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment,” showing there are some offenses heretofore not required to be 
prosecuted by indictment, and I prefer the section as it is now to the 
substitute offered to that by the gentleman. I am free to admit, however, 
that the juries should be fixed at seven. 
 
Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added).  Mr. Bowdle’s substitute, which would have required the 
prosecution of all offenses by information, was ultimately rejected in favor of existing 
territorial requirements discussed above.  Id.  At no point during the debate over art. I, 
§13, was the United States Constitution, much less the Fifth Amendment, mentioned.  
                                                 
4  The Official Report of the Proceedings and Debate of the convention: 1895 may be 
found at the following address: 
http://www.le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/utconstconv.htm 
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The drafters intent that art. I, §13, refer to territorial laws was clearly stated during the 
debates over the provision. 
That the drafters intended art. I, §13, to refer to territorial laws is further supported 
by the state constitutions on which this provision is based.  During the debates, the 
Constitutions of California and Washington were described as having similar provisions 
to art. I, §13, in that they both referred to the laws in existence prior to their enactment.  
In 1895, the “revised or new” Constitution of the State of California referred to 
“[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment . . .”  Cal. Const. art. I, 
§8.5  Mr. Bowdle’s reference to California’s new Constitution specified that it “had in 
mind [California’s] old constitution.”6
Next, the Constitution of the State of Washington was discussed.  As with 
California, the Washington Constitution then contained language identical to that of art. I, 
§13, of our State Constitution.  Id.  As Mr. Maloney stated, this provision “meant under 
the territorial system.”  Id.     
  Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of 
the Convention: 1895, 313 (1898).    
  As shown by these debates, the intent of the drafters of the Utah Constitution was 
that art. I, §13, refer to territorial laws.  To do so, the drafters considered other 
constitutions which successfully referred to prior or territorial laws, and copied their 
language.  Id.  To the drafters of Utah’s Constitution, the answer to the question of what 
                                                 
5  California’s current constitution reads “Felonies shall be prosecuted as provided by 
law, either by indictment or, after examination and commitment by a magistrate, by 
information.” Cal. Const. art. I, §14. 
6  “No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, . . . 
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.”  Cal. Const. art. I, §8  (1849).   
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“offenses heretofore required” referred was clear:  Offenses heretofore required to be 
prosecuted by indictment “[i]n the Territory.”  Id.  
The drafters’ intent that art. I, §13, refer to territorial law is also seen through other 
provisions of the Utah Constitution.  Consider, for example, article VIII, section 1, of our 
State Constitution.  This provision vested the judicial power of the state “in a Supreme 
Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other 
courts as the legislature by statute may establish.”  Utah Const. art. VIII, §1.  Although 
similar to article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution, the drafters’ intent of 
article VIII, section 1, was not to echo the Federal Constitution but to streamline exiting 
territorial laws which provided for a Supreme Court, district court, probate court and 
justices’ court.  See Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. II, §3001 (1888); Official Report of the 
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 492-93, 1316 (1898) (to make courts 
of the State of Utah more efficient, the judiciary committee eliminated probate courts).   
During the debates on article VIII, the onus was not on what was required by the 
Federal Constitution, but on what had worked under territorial law.  The Federal 
Constitution was not discussed during these debates.  Only territorial laws, the needs of 
the counties, and the effectiveness of existing territorial laws were discussed.  See 
Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention: 1895, 1315-17, 1321, 
1323, 1327-28 (1898).   
This omission does not suggest a lack of respect for, or consideration of, the 
United States Constitution, but it demonstrates the drafters’ understanding that the laws 
of the Territory of Utah had already passed constitutional muster.  Organic Act, Section 
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VI; Norman, 52 P. at 988.  For the drafters of our State Constitution, there was no need to 
mess with a good thing.  Rather than start from scratch, they focused on refining 
territorial laws while taking advantage of new opportunities, so as “to make the 
government for the state complete and operative from the very time of the taking effect of 
the Constitution.”  Lewis, 72 P. at 390.  For this purpose, art. I, §13, was patterned on 
provisions from other constitutions which successfully referred to territorial, or previous, 
laws.   
Art. I, §13, was drafted with the intent that it refer to the laws of the Territory of 
Utah, which clearly required the prosecution of classes of offenses now known as class A 
misdemeanors by indictment.  Art. I, §13, therefore, requires preliminary hearings to be 
held in cases of class A misdemeanors which are prosecuted by information. 
c. This Court has consistently interpreted article I, section 13, as referring to 
Utah Territorial law, thereby requiring preliminary hearings to be held in 
all cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information.  
 
That art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution refers to territorial laws is a concept 
which this Court has clearly understood and discussed since our State Constitution was 
ratified.  It is, in fact, a concept which this Court has relied upon as a fact in reaching its 
holdings on other issues.  An analysis of this Court’s discussions of art. I, §13, show that 
the phrase “[o]ffenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment” refers to 
territorial laws.   
In State v. Nelson, this Court held that a defendant who was convicted of having 
committed the crime of carnal knowledge of a female under 18 and over 13 years of age, 
an indictable misdemeanor, was denied a fair trial because the date of the offense alleged 
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at trial was different from that which was contained in the information, and presented at 
the preliminary hearing.  176 P. 860, 864 (Utah 1918).   
In reaching its conclusion, the Nelson Court noted that art. I, §13, of the Utah 
Constitution was  
[P]lain and unequivocal. Its meaning cannot be misunderstood by any one 
who reads it with ordinary care. It means that a felony or an indictable 
misdemeanor, after the adoption of the Constitution, could only be 
prosecuted in one of two ways: (1) By information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate, unless an examination be waived by the 
accused with the consent of the state; and (2) by indictment with or without 
such examination and commitment.   
 
Id. at 861.  
In State v. McIntyre, a defendant convicted in district court of the crime of 
conspiracy to commit extortion, an indictable misdemeanor, moved to vacate his 
conviction, arguing that the district court erred in holding a preliminary examination on 
his case.  66 P.2d 879, 880-81 (Utah 1937).  Article VIII, section 21, of the Utah 
Constitution7
The McIntyre Court rejected this argument, finding that article VIII, §section 21, 
said “may hold,” which on its face is not a prohibition on holding preliminary 
examinations on cases other than felonies.  Id. In reaching this decision, the McIntyre 
Court noted that because conspiracy to commit extortion “was an offense required to be 
prosecuted by indictment” prior to the adoption of the State Constitution, under art. I, 
, he argued, limited the power of district court judges to hold preliminary 
hearings only in cases of felonies.  Id. at 881.   
                                                 
7  “Judges of the Supreme Court, District Courts, and justices of the peace, shall be 
conservators of the peace, and may hold preliminary examinations in cases of felony.” 
Utah Const. art. VIII, §21 (repealed 1984) 
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§13, the offense may “now be prosecuted by information after examination and 
commitment by a magistrate.”  Id. at 881-82.     
In State v. Johnson, this Court was asked to decide the proper venue for the 
commencement of a “non-indictable misdemeanor.”8
Justice Pratt further noted that the codification of territorial laws in the Utah 
Constitution is also seen in art. I, §13, which “recognizes that there were certain offenses 
which were not required to be prosecuted by indictment” and were subject to prosecution 
before a Justice of the Peace.  Id. at 1044.  Laws indicating that non-indictable 
misdemeanors “were not to be initiated in the District Court,” were passed to conform “to 
section 13 of Article 1 of the Constitution” which “deal[s] with felonies and indictable 
misdemeanors but not with misdemeanors.”  Id.  
  114 P.2d 1034, 1039, 1042 (Utah 
1941) superseded by statute, Utah R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), (d) (1992).  In his concurrence 
Justice Pratt noted that territorial laws regarding the jurisdiction of justice courts were 
codified as State law by article VIII, section 8, of the Utah Constitution.  Id. at 1043 
(Pratt, J. concurring); Utah Const. art. VIII, §8 (amended 1984).   
 Returning to the case at hand, the State’s response discounts the cases cited to in 
Mr. Hernandez’s petition because their analysis of art. I, §13, was deficient, and mostly 
found in dicta.  The State fails to acknowledge, however, that prior to its response, all of 
the interested parties had conceded that art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution referred to 
territorial law.  (R. 75-78; 160-62; 168-73; 204-211; 219-28; 236-44).    
                                                 
8  The Johnson Court ultimately held that although the district court had original 
jurisdiction over all criminal cases, the proper venue for the case was in “Justices’ court.”  
State v. Johnson, 114 P.2d 1034, 1043 (Utah 1941).    
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The sufficiency of the above analysis aside (all of the cases cited above were 
referenced in Mr. Hernandez’s initial petition), the State is correct in its assertion that 
most references to art. I, §13, of our State Constitution are contained in dicta.  But the 
State misses the significance of this fact.  
Never before has the fact that art. I, §13, refers to territorial laws been challenged 
or questioned.  The State’s response is the first time in over one-hundred fourteen years 
that the argument has been made that art. I, §13, of the Utah Constitution refers 
exclusively to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and ignores Utah 
Territorial law.   
The lack of analysis complained of by the State is not due to a mistake which has 
spanned over one-hundred fourteen years, but it is because it has always been known, 
accepted and understood that art. I, §13, of our State Constitution refers to Utah 
Territorial Law. 
The prosecution of misdemeanors punishable by fines and/or imprisonment in 
excess of the jurisdictional limits of Justice Courts (currently fines in excess of one 
thousand dollars, imprisonment of up to one year, or both) by information, after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, was once common in the State of Utah.9
                                                 
9  See e.g., State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342, 344-45 (Utah 1979) (discussing the procedure for 
prosecuting indictable and non-indictable misdemeanors out of a single incident); State v. 
Cooley, 575 P.2d 693, 693 (Utah 1978) (Defendant charged with failure to stop vehicle at 
the command of a police officer, “an indictable misdemeanor triable only on information 
or indictment in the district court”); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State Tax Commission of 
Utah, 504 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1972) (Failure to file necessary reports with the State Tax 
Commission of Utah was an indictable misdemeanor) (citing 41-11-21 U.C.A. 1953); 
State v. Callahan, 488 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1971) (Defendant charged with willfully and 
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But sometime after 1980 these offenses stopped being properly prosecuted, leading us to 
the case at hand where Mr. Hernandez’s request for a preliminary examination was 
denied, even though he has been charged with numerous “indictable,” or class A, 
misdemeanors.   
For these reasons, State’s argument is without merit. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
unlawfully resisting a police officer in discharging or attempting to discharge the duty of 
his office in making a lawful arrest, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Boone, 483 P.2d 
238 (Utah 1971) (Defendant charged with resisting an officer, an indictable 
misdemeanor); State v. Brennan, 371 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1962) (Defendant charged with 
driving while intoxicated and injuring another person in a reckless or negligent manner, 
an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Berchtold, 357 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1960) 
(Defendant charged with negligent homicide, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. 
Sandman, 286 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1955) (“’Every person who willfully resists, delays 
or obstructs any public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge, any duty of his 
office * * * is punishable by fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment in the county 
jail not exceeding one year, or by both.’ thus constituting an indictable misdemeanor”) 
(citation omitted); Ogden City v. Adams, 245 P.2d 851, 852 (Utah 1952) (Provision of the 
Liquor Control Act, Chap. 43, Laws of Utah 1935, U.C.A. 1943, 46-0-43 et seq., which 
required district attorneys to represent the State in criminal actions tried in the district 
court referred to indictable misdemeanors and felonies); State v. Stewart, 171 P.2d 383, 
385 (Utah 1946) (A person convicted of a second offense of “drunken driving” is 
punishable as an indictable misdemeanor, in which a defendant so charged would be 
entitled to a preliminary hearing, and the case would be triable in the district court); State 
v. Kallas,  94 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1939) (Defendant charged with common nuisance, 
under the Liquor Control Act, an indictable misdemeanor); In re Pearce, 136 P.2d 969, 
970 (Utah 1943) (crime of criminal conspiracy an indictable misdemeanor); State v. 
McIntyre, 66 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1937) (Defendant convicted in district court of the 
crime of conspiracy to commit extortion, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Cragun, 
20 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah 1933) (Defendant charged with practicing obstetrics without a 
license, an indictable misdemeanor); State v. Olsen, 289 P. 92, 93 (Utah 1930) (The 
crime of false imprisonment is included within the crime of kidnapping, the former an 
indictable misdemeanor and the latter a felony); State v. Hale, 263 P. 86, 87 (Utah 1927) 
((Defendant charged with treating human ailments without a license, an indictable 
misdemeanor not triable before city courts). 
 18 
II. IN CASES PROSECUTED BY INFORMATION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 13, 
OF UTAH’S CONSTITUTION REQUIRES MAGISTRATES TO CONSIDER 
AND WEIGH ACTUAL EVIDENCE AND THE SWORN TESTIMONY OF 
WITNESSES BEFORE THE ACCUSED MAY BE BOUND OVER FOR 
TRIAL 
 
Art. I, §13, states that in “offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment” an “examination and commitment by a magistrate” must be held, “unless the 
examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State . . .”  Utah Const. art. 
I, §13 (emphasis added).  In its response, the State argues that the probable cause 
statement included with informations filed to commence criminal prosecutions of cases 
involving felonies and class A misdemeanors, satisfies the requirements of art. I, §13.  
The State’s argument is flawed on its face, and in its substance. 
On its face, the State fails to explain how the accused can waive the examination 
of a sworn affidavit that is filed and read by the magistrate before the defendant’s 
involvement with the case.10
                                                 
10  If the State’s argument is true, however, and an information “sworn to by a person 
having reason to believe the offense has been committed” satisfies the requirements of 
article I, section 13, our criminal justice system, as currently constituted, violates the 
rights of the accused in every case of a felony or indictable misdemeanor in that the 
accused is never given the opportunity to ask that the examination and commitment be 
waived before it is reviewed by a magistrate. 
  Art. I, §13, clearly suggests that there would be 
circumstances in which the State and defendant would agree to waive their preliminary 
hearing and bind the matter over for arraignment and trial.  For this to happen, the 
defendant would have to be involved with the case prior to making a decision regarding 
the examination and commitment by a magistrate.  Because the State’s alternative 
argument ignores this reality, it is without merit. 
 19 
Additionally, the State’s argument that today’s preliminary hearing is a legislative 
gift, and not required by our State Constitution, ignores the constitutional requirements of 
the “examination and commitment by a magistrate.”   
This Court has taken great strides to clarify the standards required at different 
stages of the prosecution of criminal cases.  State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ¶18, 137 P.3d 
787.  Thanks to these efforts it is now well understood that “probable cause” is the 
standard required to issue an arrest warrant and to bind a criminal complaint over for 
trial.  See, id. (“[T]he probable cause that the prosecution must establish in a preliminary 
hearing ... is the same as the probable cause that the prosecution must show to obtain an 
arrest warrant.”); see also State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶16, 20 P.3d 300 (“[A]t both the 
arrest warrant and the preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient 
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it”) (citation omitted).  Whether seeking an arrest warrant, or asking 
a criminal complaint to be bound over for trial, sufficient evidence must be presented 
before a magistrate to allow a determination of probable cause.   
In its response, the State confuses and misapplies the evidentiary requirements for 
issuing an arrest warrant with the evidentiary requirements for bindover, arguing that the 
evidence required to determine probable cause to issue an arrest warrant is all that is 
required under our State Constitution to bind a case over for trial.  When viewed in its 
proper light, this argument is without merit. 
Regarding the initiation of criminal cases, our rules state that “[u]nless otherwise 
provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or infraction shall 
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be commenced by the filing of an information11 or the return of an indictment.”12  Utah R. 
Crim. P. 5(a) (emphasis added).  Although currently called an “information,” historically, 
the document filed to commence a criminal prosecution was called a “complaint.”13
The basic requirements for the initiation of criminal prosecutions have remained 
consistent throughout the history of Utah.  Under territorial law, a criminal prosecution 
began with a complaint, filed before a magistrate, which was based on, and stated, the 
information and belief that an offense was committed, and that the accused had 
  See 
State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 466 n.2 (Utah 1991) (under Utah’s current statutory 
scheme, informations have replaced complaints in pre-bindover situations).  This 
changing terminology has resulted in some confusion regarding the requirements for the 
prosecution of felonies and indictable misdemeanors.  
                                                 
11  Although Utah law identifies the document filed to initiate a criminal prosecution and 
secure the appearance of the accused (by warrant or summons) as an “information,” in 
cases of felonies and class A misdemeanors, this document does not become an 
“information,” as required by our State constitution, until a magistrate has examined the 
evidence, found probable cause that the accused has committed the crimes alleged in the 
complaint and ordered the accused to be bound over for trial before the district court.  
Utah Const. art. I, §13.    
12  Because the issue before this Court is whether a preliminary hearing is required in 
cases of class A misdemeanors being prosecuted by information, the requirements for 
prosecuting such cases by indictment under Utah law will not be thoroughly analyzed in 
this response.   
13  In 1935, the Utah legislature modified the procedure whereby felonies and indictable 
misdemeanors were filed by enacting “section §105-21-5 (Chapter 118), Laws of Utah, 
1935 which by implication says that an information may be used for an offense in which 
there has been no preliminary hearings.  In such a case an oath must be taken to the 
information.  This in effect makes the information a complaint.”  State v. Johnson, 114 
P.2d 1034, 1044 (Utah 1941) (Pratt, J. concurring).  This enactment is the source of this 
change in terminology.   
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committed it.  U.S. v. Eldredge, 13 P. 673, 675-76 (Utah. Terr. 1887) appeal dismissed, 
145 U.S. 636 (1887).   
Following statehood, criminal prosecutions were required to begin with a 
“statement in writing” made to a magistrate which stated: “(1) The name of the accused, 
if known; *** (2) the county in which the offense was committed; (3) the general name 
of the crime or public offense; (4) the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the 
crime or public offense named.”  State v. Anderson, 101 P. 385, 386 (Utah 1909) (citation 
omitted).   
Currently, Utah law requires criminal prosecutions to begin with the filing of an 
information which has been “sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense 
has been committed,” Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a), and to state the offense being prosecuted in 
terms “sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge.”  Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b).    
As stated in Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the purpose of the 
affidavit filed with the information is to give the magistrate sufficient information to 
determine if “there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and 
that the accused has committed it.”  If the initial affidavit contains enough information 
for this determination to be made, the magistrate is required to “issue either a warrant for 
the arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused.”  Utah R. Crim. P. 6(a).   
The purpose of the complaint, or information, is to secure the appearance of the 
accused before a magistrate, and to notify the accused of the charges against them. 
Following this initial filing and determination of probable cause, in felonies and 
class A misdemeanors an “examination and commitment by a magistrate” must be held to 
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determine if the accused should be required to stand trial on the charges.  Utah Const. art. 
I, §13; see also Anderson, 101 P. at 387 (in cases of felonies or indictable misdemeanors, 
following the filing of the complaint before a magistrate, the case then proceeded to an 
examination of the evidence, after which an information is filed).   
The examination and commitment required by article I, section 13, of the Utah 
Constitution, “was designed, to some extent, to accomplish the purpose of a presentment 
by a grand jury14
In Utah, preliminary hearings are adversarial in nature, and provide defendants 
“the ‘opportunity to attach the prosecution’s evidence and to present any affirmative 
defenses.’  Although the hearing is not a trial per se, it is not an ex parte proceeding nor 
one-sided determination of probable cause . . .”  Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31 (emphasis 
added) (quoting State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980)).  The prosecution 
must present evidence “sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the defendant 
 under the law as it existed before, in protecting a party against being 
subjected to the indignity of a public trial for an offense before probable cause has been 
established against him by evidence under oath.”  State v. Spencer, 49 P. 302, 304 (Utah 
1897) (citation omitted).  Today, the “examination and commitment” is known as a 
preliminary hearing.  
                                                 
14  The function of a grand jury cannot be satisfied by a sworn affidavit presented to them 
by the prosecuting attorney.  Grand juries consider and weigh actual evidence.  People v. 
Robinson, 21 P. 403, 404 (Utah Terr. 1889) (witnesses must be called to testify at grand 
jury proceedings); People v. Greenwell, 13 P. 89, 91 (Utah Terr. 1887) (grand juries are 
required to weigh all evidence submitted to them, and when they believe other evidence 
may “explain away the charge,” they are required to order the prosecuting attorney to 
produce such evidence).  
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committed the charged crime.”  Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶17 (citation omitted); see also State 
v. Ortega, 751 P.2d 1138, 1140 (Utah 1988). 
For nearly the first century of our State’s existence the accused were guaranteed 
the “entire panoply of [rights guaranteed by Utah’s Confrontation Clause] at the 
preliminary examination.”  State v. Timmerman, 2009 UT 58, ¶14, 218 P.3d 590 (citation 
omitted).  In 1995, however, article I, section 12, was amended to limit Utah’s 
Confrontation Clause by adding a second paragraph that allowed the use of reliable 
hearsay evidence, as defined by statute or rule15
The primary purpose for the heightened evidentiary requirements of preliminary 
hearings is to provide the magistrate sufficient information to allow her to ferret out 
groundless prosecutions before they go to trial, thereby relieving the accused of the 
substantial degradation and expenses incurred in a modern criminal trial when the 
charges against the accused are unwarranted, or the evidence insufficient.  Virgin, 2006 
UT at ¶¶19-20, ¶33; Anderson, Utah, 612 P.2d at 783-84.
, “in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause . . .”  Even under this diminished constitutional 
standard, an information that contains no evidence other than having been “sworn to by a 
person having reason to believe the offense has been committed” would not be 
admissible at a preliminary.  Utah R. Crim. P. 4(a).   
16
                                                 
15  Reliable hearsay is defined by Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.  
  This information must be 
sufficient to allow the magistrate to “observe and assess witness demeanor and 
16  See also, e.g., Utah Const. art. I, §1 (“All men have the inherent and inalienable right 
to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties”), id. at §7 (“No person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty or property, without due process of law”). 
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credibility” to determine whether the “evidence is wholly incapable of supporting a 
reasonable belief as to a part of the prosecution’s case.”  Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31 
(citations omitted).   
Preliminary hearings give defendants an opportunity to “introduce evidence which 
tends to exonerate him, or to explain away the charge.”  Anderson, 101 P. at 386; see also 
Virgin, 2006 UT at ¶31 (preliminary hearings give defendants the opportunity to present 
affirmative defenses).  They also “enable the defendant to inform himself of the nature of 
the accusation made against him . . . and [to be] given an opportunity to fully inform 
himself of the facts and circumstances upon which the state relies to sustain the charge, 
and be prepared to meet it when he is brought to trial.”  Anderson, 101 P. at 386 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added).  These hearings also serve as “a means to discover and 
preserve evidence favorable to his defense.”  Kearns-Tribune Corp., Publisher of Salt 
Lake Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted).  Finally, in 
cases where the defendant ultimately pleads guilty, these hearings may “provide the only 
occasion for a public hearing of the prosecution’s evidence.”  Id.     
These purposes and rights cannot be secured by a sworn statement on a piece of 
paper filed by the state to commence a criminal prosecution.  Although such sparse 
evidence is sufficient to initiate a criminal case, the suggestion that it is all that is 
required under our State Constitution for preliminary hearings is contrary to our laws and 
precedent. 
Ultimately, the State’s argument that a sworn affidavit is sufficient evidence for a 
preliminary hearing was decided by this Court over one hundred years ago.  In State v. 
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Anderson, this Court found that “a complaint which states the name of the crime charged, 
the time and place of its commission, the name of the accused, if known, and sets out in 
general terms the acts or omissions constituting the public offense or crime charged” is 
“lacking in other averments which would be necessary in an indictment or information.”  
101 P. at 386.   
It is for this reason that the arguments raised on appeal by the State are without 
merit.  The preliminary examinations discussed in Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure embody the requirements of art. I, §13, of our State Constitution.   
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, an analysis of the plain text of art. I, §13, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, shows that this provision refers to territorial laws, and therefore requires 
preliminary hearings in cases of class A misdemeanors prosecuted by information.  This 
conclusion is supported by the stated intent of the drafters of our State Constitution, as 
well as this Court’s precedent. 
Additionally, the purposes of a preliminary hearing, as required by art. I, §13, are 
not satisfied by a complaint filed with an affidavit sworn to by someone having reason to 
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the accused committed it.    
Mr. Hernandez asks that this Court order the district court to grant his request for a 
preliminary hearing, and restore the prosecution of class A misdemeanors to the process 
required by the Utah Constitution, and practiced throughout most of our State’s history.   
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SUBMITTED this _______ day of August, 2010. 
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